Coordination with communication under oath
研究通过自愿签署诚实宣誓这一制度设计，能否借助社会心理学中的承诺理论减少协调失败。实验发现，宣誓使协调成功率提升近50%，发送者信息更真实，接收者信任度提高。
Abstract We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50%; (2) senders’ messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers’ trust of messages increased.