Buying Informed Voters: New Effects of Information on Voters and Candidates
通过菲律宾的两项实验，研究发现向选民提供政府能力信息会降低对现任官员的支持，但官员可能通过买票等行为抵消这一影响，为设计干预措施提供了指导。
Abstract Despite the prominence of information in theories of electoral accountability, providing voters with information often fails to improve politician performance. Using two experiments in the Philippines, we show that when voters are unfamiliar with basic government capabilities, merely informing them of what politicians could do is sufficient to decrease support for incumbents. However, politicians can counteract this decrease in support by increasing clientelistic practices such as vote buying. Our work shows how even neutral information campaigns can improve the leverage of voters vis-à-vis their politicians, offering guidance for the design of interventions to change the electoral equilibrium in clientelistic countries.