Payoff implications of incentive contracting
在经典委托代理模型中，研究分析师在不知代理人偏好但知委托人知情时，最优激励合同给委托人带来的预期收益的严格界限，展示如何在关键参数未知时做出稳健的经济预测。
In the context of a canonical agency model, we study the payoff implications of introducing optimally structured incentives. We do so from the perspective of an analyst who does not know the agent's preferences for responding to incentives, but does know that the principal knows them. We provide, in particular, tight bounds on the principal's expected benefit from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically relevant predictions can be made robustly given ignorance of a key primitive.