The Economics of Hedge Fund Startups: Theory and Empirical Evidence
研究了市场摩擦如何影响新对冲基金的经理激励和组织结构，发现面临低投资者需求的冷启动基金表现优于热启动基金和家族附属基金。
ABSTRACT This paper examines how market frictions influence the managerial incentives and organizational structure of new hedge funds. We develop a stylized model in which new managers search for accredited investors and have stronger incentives to acquire managerial skill when encountering low investor demand. Fund families endogenously arise to mitigate frictions and weaken the performance incentives of affiliated new funds. Empirically, based on a TASS‐HFR‐BarclayHedge merged database, we find that ex ante identified cold inceptions facing low investor demand outperform existing hedge funds and hot inceptions facing high demand and that cold stand‐alone inceptions outperform all types of family‐affiliated inceptions.