40 years of tax evasion games: a meta-analysis
汇总70篇实验室实验论文的个体数据，通过元分析评估公共政策、实验设计和个体变量对逃税行为的影响，发现审计和罚款在广延边际与集约边际上效果不同，而统一税制、税率和税收赦免明确降低遵从度。
Abstract We collect individual participant data from 70 papers that use laboratory experiments to examine individual tax evasion behavior (or “Tax Evasion Games”), in order to use meta-analysis to estimate the impacts of different public policy, experimental design and individual level variables on tax evasion choices. Our results show that standard enforcement variables like audits (including audit rules) and fines perform differently on the extensive and intensive margins. We find that other fiscal variables like a flat tax system, tax rates, and tax amnesties have unambiguous negative impacts on tax compliance, and that specific features of the experimental setting, such as how subjects are directed to report income, or whether taxes are redistributed to the participants or to a real life public good, have significant impacts on tax compliance. Our results also indicate that the demographic characteristics of the subjects (e.g., gender, experimental income, occupation, risk attitude) affect compliance.