Time‐Limited Loyalty Rewards*
研究垄断者向老顾客提供限时折扣的模型，发现到期日能约束消费者延迟兑换奖励的行为，提升忠诚度计划效率，但可能损害消费者利益。
I examine an infinite‐horizon model in which a monopolist can commit to sell the good to repeat customers at a reduced price. Such an option may or may not expire. Consumer preferences are subject to temporary shocks, which implies that loyalty rewards can raise efficiency by contracting prior to private information arrival. I show that expiration dates enhance the effectiveness of loyalty programs by disciplining consumers, who otherwise would excessively delay the redemption of rewards, and reduce the frequency of purchases. Moreover, if firms can influence future regular prices then loyalty programs become more profitable, but may harm consumers.