Do Verified Earnings Reports Increase Investment?*
通过实验研究，发现经过验证的盈利报告能单独提高投资，但若同时允许自由沟通，其效果不明显，因为管理者会调整行为。
ABSTRACT A common view is that verified earnings reports encourage investment through improved transparency. We lack direct evidence on this foundational proposition because researchers cannot observe counterfactuals in which a manager either (i) must remain silent about performance or (ii) can make any statement about performance they desire, even a bald‐faced lie. We experimentally manipulate whether a manager can provide information to an investor by voluntarily disclosing a verified earnings report, communicating freely via unverifiable cheap talk, or both. Our experiment involves repeated interactions between an uninformed investor with funds that, if invested, generate uncertain gains, and a trustee‐manager who observes and then divides gains after they are realized. We hypothesize and find that (i) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to higher investment compared with a world in which reporting is not possible and (ii) the provision of a verified earnings report leads to more accurate cheap talk communication than when earnings reports are unavailable. Contrary to our prediction, we find that investment when both earnings reports and cheap talk are possible is statistically indistinguishable from investment when only cheap talk communication is available. Further tests reveal that a lack of verified earnings reports leads managers to sustain a partner's investment by providing high returns to the investor while also limiting (but not completely eliminating) deceptive communication and profit‐taking. Our main conclusion is that verified earnings reports promote investment on a stand‐alone basis by improving transparency, but the effect of greater transparency from earnings reports on investment is more nuanced when earnings reports can influence the disclosure of unverifiable information. The main implication of our evidence is that the greater transparency of management behavior with verified earnings reports is not unambiguously positive because making behavior more transparent can lead managers to change their behavior.