Insured Loans and Credit Access: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in Northern Ghana
在加纳北部进行随机实验，发现将指数保险与农业贷款捆绑（直接赔付农民或赔付银行以偿还债务）能使农民获得贷款的可能性提高15到21个百分点，主要原因是贷款批准率上升，而非申请率变化。
We conducted a two‐treatment randomized control trial in northern Ghana to investigate how bundling index insurance with agricultural loans affects smallholder access to credit. In one treatment, farmer groups were invited to apply for production loans bundled with an index insurance contract that, in the event of a drought, indemnifies farmers directly (micro‐insured loans). In the second treatment, farmer groups were invited to apply for production loans bundled with an index insurance contract that, in the event of a drought, indemnifies the lender on the condition that the indemnity be used to retire the farmer's debt obligation (meso‐insured loans). Farmer groups in the control category were invited to apply for uninsured loans. We find that insured loans increase farmers' likelihood of receiving credit by between 15 and 21 percentage points. Exploring the mechanisms of this effect, we find no impact on the likelihood that farmers apply for credit but do find an increase in the likelihood of loan approvals of between 17 and 25 percentage points.