Preference Elicitation for Participatory Budgeting
研究了四种偏好诱导方法（背包投票、按价值或性价比排序、阈值批准投票）在参与式预算中最大化社会福利的效果，发现阈值批准投票在理论和实验中均表现更优。
Participatory budgeting enables the allocation of public funds by collecting and aggregating individual preferences. It has already had a sizable real-world impact, but making the most of this new paradigm requires rethinking some of the basics of computational social choice, including the very way in which individuals express their preferences. We attempt to maximize social welfare by using observed votes as proxies for voters’ unknown underlying utilities, and analytically compare four preference elicitation methods: knapsack votes, rankings by value or value for money, and threshold approval votes. We find that threshold approval voting is qualitatively superior, and also performs well in experiments using data from real participatory budgeting elections. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.