Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Innovation
利用美国23个州1989至2005年逐步采纳通用需求法的自然实验，研究发现股东诉讼风险降低后企业增加了研发投入和探索性创新产出，表明诉讼压力会抑制管理层的创新活动。
We investigate whether and to what extent shareholder litigation shapes corporate innovation by examining the staggered adoption of universal demand laws in 23 states from 1989 to 2005. These laws impose obstacles against shareholders filing derivative lawsuits, thereby significantly reducing managers’ litigation risk. Using a difference-in-differences design and a matched sample, we find that, following the passage of the laws, firms invested more in research and development, produced more patents in new technological classes and more patents based on new knowledge, generated more patents with significant impacts, and achieved higher patent value. Our findings suggest that the external pressure imposed by shareholder litigation discourages managers from engaging in explorative innovation activities. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.