Fighting Crises with Secrecy
研究了危机期间中央银行不公开借款银行身份的贷款操作如何通过提高市场对银行资产质量的预期来防止挤兑，并分析了抵押品折扣率作为保密下限制贷款使用的关键工具。
How does central bank lending during a crisis restore confidence? Emergency lending facilities that are opaque (in that names of borrowers are kept secret) raise the perceived average quality of bank assets in the economy, creating an information externality that prevents runs. Stigma (the cost of a bank’s participation at the lending facility becoming public) is desirable to implement opacity as an equilibrium outcome, as no bank wants to reveal its participation status. The central bank’s key policy instrument for limiting the use of lending facilities while maintaining secrecy is the haircut applied to bank assets used as collateral.