Nonmarket Responses to Regulation: A Signaling Theory Approach
研究了监管强度如何影响企业的非市场活动（企业社会责任和政治活动），发现监管强度增加会促使企业加强非市场回应，且两者存在非线性关系。
We examine how regulatory intensity and increases in regulation affect the nonmarket activities of firms. Using a signaling theory perspective, we seek to better understand how firms respond to regulation in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate political activity (CPA), the two main pillars of nonmarket activity. Examination of both CSR and CPA in concert rather than in isolation provides insights into whether they are complements or substitutes. We use textual analysis of the US Code of Federal Regulations to measure regulatory intensity and increases in regulation. Based on a sample of 331 S&P 500 firms for the period 1998–2014, our findings suggest that regulatory intensity leads to more nonmarket responses from firms. We also find support for nonlinear relationships between CSR and CPA.