A Unified Model of Firm Dynamics with Limited Commitment and Assortative Matching
构建了一个动态契约与分类匹配的统一理论模型，解释企业规模与CEO薪酬的幂律分布及其尾部差异，并定量拟合企业投资、股利和CEO薪酬的时序与截面特征。
ABSTRACT We develop a unified theory of dynamic contracting and assortative matching to explain firm dynamics. In our model, neither firms nor managers can commit to arrangements that yield lower payoffs than their outside options, which are microfounded by the equilibrium conditions in a matching market. The model endogenously generates power laws in firm size and CEO compensation, and explains differences in their right tails. We also show that our model quantitatively accounts for many salient features of the time‐series dynamics and the cross‐sectional distribution of firm investment, dividend payout, and CEO compensation.