Asymmetric Reporting Timeliness and Informational Feedback
研究了好消息与坏消息报告及时性的不对称如何影响价格信息含量，发现更及时地报告坏消息能激励投机者交易私有信息，从而提高投资水平和企业价值。
We examine the effects of asymmetric timeliness in reporting good versus bad news on price informativeness when prices provide useful information to assist firms’ investment decisions. We find that a reporting system featuring more timely disclosure of bad news than of good news encourages speculators to trade on their private information. Consequently, it generates a higher expected investment level and firm value. Our analysis generates predictions consistent with empirical findings and provides a justification for the more timely reporting of bad news in the absence of managerial incentive problems. This paper was accepted by Brian Bushee, accounting.