Reverse payments, patent strength, and asymmetric information
研究了原研药厂向仿制药厂支付反向和解金（付费延迟）的影响，发现考虑投资和信息不对称时，反向支付可能增加仿制药进入和诉讼率，从而提升消费者剩余，全面禁止可能并非最优。
Reverse payments (pay-for-delay) are payments from an originator to a generic pharmaceutical producer to settle a potential litigation. In many jurisdictions, these payments are banned. This study shows that when the parties' investments are considered and the information about the patent strength is asymmetric, reverse payments increase both the possibility of generic entry and the litigation rate-both of which increase consumer surplus and do not necessarily delay generic entry. Reverse payments typically increase consumer surplus when the asymmetry between the parties is low, the competitiveness in the market is soft, and their size is small. Results suggest that a ban per se may be suboptimal.