TESTING PASSIVE VERSUS SYMMETRIC BELIEFS IN CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES
提出识别和估计方法，用于分析存在外部性和不完全信息的合约模型，并通过检验判断被动信念或对称信念哪个更符合数据，对政策评估有重要意义。
Abstract This article provides identification and estimation methods for a model of contracting with externalities and imperfect information. In this model, one principal offers a contract of trade quantity to each of multiple agents, and the negotiated payment for each agent is determined via Nash bargaining. Beliefs matter due to the privacy of bilateral contracting and the externalities from the dependence of each agent's payoff on all agents' trade quantities. We provide a test to determine whether passive or symmetric beliefs fit a given data set better. The empirical results suggest the relevance of adopting the correct beliefs for policy evaluations.