Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources
研究了学校选择、课程分配和难民安置等离散资源分配问题，证明了在离散环境中强效率与通过价格去中心化之间的等价关系，为市场设计中使用伪市场提供了理论基础。
We study the assignment of discrete resources in a general model encompassing a wide range of applied environments, such as school choice, course allocation, and refugee resettlement. We allow single-unit and general multi-unit demands and any linear constraints. We prove the Second Welfare Theorem for these environments and a strong version of the First Welfare Theorem. In this way, we establish an equivalence between strong efficiency and decentralization through prices in discrete environments. Showing that all strongly efficient outcomes can be implemented through pseudomarkets, we provide a foundation for using pseudomarkets in market design.