Signaling Under Double‐Crossing Preferences
研究了当两种类型的无差异曲线交叉两次时（即单交叉性质不成立）的信号传递问题，发现均衡中存在一个阈值类型，低于该阈值时类型完全揭示，高于阈值时成对混同，且信号行动在类型上是拟凹的。
This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double‐crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where the indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single‐crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The resulting signaling action is quasi‐concave in type. We also provide an algorithm to establish equilibrium existence by construction.