A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory
重新分析Forsythe等人的投票实验数据，发现考虑风险规避后，每轮游戏行为符合一个特定的进化稳定可达均衡，该均衡在另一处理中校准。
Abstract We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe et al. (Soc Choice Welf 10:223–247, 1993). In every one of 24 rounds, 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every round is given by a particular evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium of the 14-player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk aversion (or a heightened concern for coordination), calibrated in another treatment.