Victim Incentives and Criminal Activity: Evidence from Bus Driver Robberies in Chile
利用智利公交改革的时间节点和详细行政数据，研究受害者反抗倾向如何改变犯罪活动的水平和性质，并发现取消现金交易的技术创新大幅降低了犯罪率。
Abstract This paper analyzes crime as a function of the interaction between offenders and victims. I study robbery of bus drivers, a crime that remains common in cities throughout the world. Exploiting the timing of a Chilean public transportation reform and detailed administrative data, I show how victims' propensity to resist an attack can alter the level and nature of criminal activity. I also find a large decline in crime after the implementation of a technological innovation that eliminated cash transactions on buses. My results suggest a strong relationship between victim incentives, cash, and crime.