Trading out of sight: An analysis of cross-trading in mutual fund families
研究了共同基金与同集团兄弟基金进行交叉交易的动机，发现交叉交易要么用于机会性地重新分配业绩，要么降低交易成本，具体取决于内部监控力度和市场状态。
This paper explores the incentives for mutual funds to trade with sibling funds affiliated with the same group. To this end, we construct a dataset of almost one million equity transactions and compare the pricing of trades crossed internally (cross-trades) with that of twin trades executed with external counterparties. We find that cross-trades are used either to opportunistically reallocate performance among trading funds or to reduce transaction costs for both counterparties. The prevalent incentive depends on the intensity of internal monitoring and the market state. We discuss the implications for the literature on fund performance and the current regulatory debate.