Optimal Income Taxation with Present Bias
研究了工人存在现时偏误（偏好眼前、拖延付出努力）时，最优所得税率应如何调整，发现现时偏误会降低最优税率，且低收入时边际税率可能为负，为劳动补贴提供了新的理论依据。
Work often entails up-front effort costs in exchange for delayed benefits, and mounting evidence documents present bias over effort in the face of such delays. This paper studies the implications for the optimal income tax. Optimal tax rates are computed for present-biased workers who choose multiple dimensions of labor effort, some of which occur prior to compensation. Present bias reduces optimal tax rates, with a larger effect when the elasticity of taxable income is high. Optimal marginal tax rates may be negative at low incomes, providing an alternative, corrective rationale for work subsidies like the Earned Income Tax Credit.