The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence
研究委托代理模型中证据不完美时承诺力量的价值，发现当证据不完美时，委托人拥有承诺力量能带来优势，这与完美证据下的结论不同。
The literature initiated by Green and Laffont (1986) studies principal-agent models with hard evidence. Evidence is modeled by assuming that the message set of the agent is type dependent. In this setup, Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006) and Sher (2011) show that when the agent’s utility function is type independent there is no advantage for the principal in having commitment power. This paper shows that this way of modeling evidence implicitly assumes it to be perfectly accurate and that the result that commitment power has no value is not robust to making the evidence imperfect.