Gambling over Public Opinion
研究两方在未知公众舆论时提出初始要求，若陷入僵局则在舆论形成后重新谈判，但妥协需承担声誉成本，分析僵局何时出现及其对公众福利的影响。
We consider bargaining environments in which public opinion provides leverage by making compromises costly. Two parties make initial demands, before knowing the public opinion. If deadlocked, they can bargain again after public opinion forms, but suffer reputation costs if they compromise, i.e., scale back their demands. We show that in equilibrium, parties may choose to make incompatible demands initially and gamble over public opinion even though one or both parties must bear a cost later. We characterize when deadlocks arise, and how this affects the welfare of the public in a representative two-party democracy compared to a direct democracy.