Mobile Application's Quality and Pricing Decisions under Competition
研究了平台所有者和第三方开发者如何根据收益分成比例调整应用质量和定价，发现高成本或初始质量差异大时平台会减少质量投入，且平台可能通过影响对手质量来竞争。
ABSTRACT In this article, we investigate the pricing and quality decisions of mobile applications (apps) by the platform owner and third‐party app developer. The third‐party app developer shares some fraction of revenue with the platform owner. We investigate the impact of revenue sharing fraction on quality enhancement and pricing decisions. One would expect that, as the revenue sharing fraction earned by the platform increases, the platform's effort toward enhancing the quality of her app should increase. However, our analysis reveals that when the third‐party app developer's cost structure is high (/low), and the difference between initial app quality valuation of the platform's app and developer's app is high (/low), then the platform decreases the quality improvement efforts. Similarly, we also find that if the developer's revenue‐sharing fraction increases, he may also decrease the quality efforts. Later, we also analyze the scenario where a platform can influence the competing developer's app quality. We find that if the platform's effort only influences the competing third‐party developer's app quality, then the platform reduces the rival's app quality. Finally, in our analysis, we find that if the platform's effort toward the rival's app also enhances her app's quality, she may increase the rival's app quality.