Conventions under Heterogeneous Behavioural Rules
研究了在异质行为规则下，惯例的随机稳定性如何保持，证明不对称性在个体内、个体间及更新时机异质时仍具稳健性，拓展了相关理论的应用范围。
Abstract Strategies of players in a population are updated according to the behavioural rules of agents, where each agent is a player or a coalition of players. It is known that classic results on the stochastic stability of conventions are due to an asymmetry property of the strategy updating process. We show that asymmetry can be defined at the level of the behavioural rule and that asymmetric rules can be mixed and matched whilst retaining asymmetry of the aggregate process. Specifically, we show robustness of asymmetry to heterogeneity within an agent (Alice follows different rules at different times); heterogeneity between agents (Alice and Bob follow different rules); and heterogeneity in the timing of strategy updating. These results greatly expand and convexify the domain of behavioural rules for which results on the stochastic stability of conventions are known.