Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance
利用英国医院面板数据，研究发现护士薪酬管制导致地区间工资差异，高外部工资显著增加心脏病急救患者的死亡率，外部工资每提高10%，死亡率上升7%。
In many sectors, pay is regulated to be equal across heterogeneous geographical labor markets. When the competitive outside wage is higher than the regulated wage, there are likely to be falls in quality. We exploit panel data from the population of English hospitals in which regulated pay for nurses is essentially flat across the country. Higher outside wages significantly worsen hospital quality as measured by hospital deaths for emergency heart attacks. A 10 percent increase in the outside wage is associated with a 7 percent increase in death This is a heavily revised version of Hall, Propper, and Van Reenen (2008). We would like to thank Canice Prendagast and two anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments.