Learning to game the system
研究员工通过偷懒来学习工作重点，并利用这些信息更有效地偷懒。在长期雇佣关系中，刻画了存在这种“偷懒中学习”时的最优关系契约，并说明如何管理绩效测量系统来强化激励。
Abstract An agent may privately learn which aspects of his job are more important by shirking on some of them, and use that information to shirk more effectively in the future. In a model of long-term employment relationship, we characterize the optimal relational contract in the presence of such learning-by-shirking and highlight how the performance measurement system can be managed to sharpen incentives. Two related policies are studied: intermittent replacement of existing measures, and adoption of new ones. In spite of the learning-by-shirking effect, the optimal contract is stationary, and may involve stochastic replacement/adoption policies that dilute the agent’s information rents from learning how to game the system.