Efficiency Versus Equality in Bargaining
通过实验研究谈判结果如何随平等、效率和总收益最大化之间的权衡而变化，发现被试会避免帕累托低效的平等结果，且不平等但总收益最大化的结果更受青睐，同时存在违反无关选项独立性的折中效应。
Abstract We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.