Collective Information Acquisition
研究一群玩家在集体行动前就获取公共信号进行讨价还价的问题，玩家因私人收益不同而对信号支付意愿不同，通过机制设计刻画信息讨价还价的有效边界，并发现信息不对称和后续投票博弈导致的最优信息结构扭曲。
Abstract We consider the problem faced by a group of players who bargain over what public signal to acquire before deciding on a collective action. The players differ in their privately known state-dependent payoffs from taking the action, and therefore differ also in their willingness to pay for the public signal. We take a mechanism design approach to characterizing the efficient frontier of outcomes achievable via bargaining over information. We identify novel distortions in the optimal information structure that arise from the information asymmetry and from the fact that after the signal is realized, the outcome is determined in equilibrium of a subsequent voting game.