OBVIOUSLY STRATEGY‐PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF ASSIGNMENT RULES: A NEW CHARACTERIZATION
研究了无货币转移的不可分物品分配问题，刻画了满足帕累托有效、非霸道且可被显然策略证明机制实施的分配规则，推广了已有结论至任意人数和物品数。
Abstract We consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, nonbossy, and implementable in obviously strategy‐proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP‐implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan ( International Economic Review 60 (2019), 1249–61) provides a characterization of OSP‐implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.