Does Securitization Weaken Screening Incentives?
利用2007年非机构抵押贷款支持证券市场崩溃作为自然实验，研究发现当贷款销售可能性降低时，银行对超限贷款申请的处理时间显著增加，表明证券化确实削弱了贷款筛选激励。
Abstract We test whether lenders’ screening incentives weaken when faced with the possibility of loan sales. We adopt a new measure of lending standards, the processing time for mortgage applications at the loan level, and use the collapse of the nonagency mortgage-backed securities issuance market as a natural experiment. Secondary market liquidity for nonconforming loans decreased significantly at the end of 2007, but the market for securitizing conforming loans did not experience the same breakdown. Following this event, lenders spent significantly more time screening applications for loans larger than the conforming loan limits than for those below the limits. The processing-time gap widened more for banks with lower capital, greater involvement in the originate-to-distribute model, and larger assets.