Benefit or burden? A comparison of CFO and CEO outside directorships
比较CFO与CEO的外部董事任职对其所在公司的战略投资、资本管理和长期绩效的影响，发现CFO的外部董事任职能减少投资不足、降低现金持有对现金流的敏感性并提升长期绩效，而CEO则无明显知识转移效应。
Abstract We study the association between chief financial officer (CFO), compared to chief executive officer (CEO), outside board directorships and their home‐firm strategic investments, capital management, and overall performance. Using a sample of firms from 2003 to 2014, we find that only about 9% of CFOs, compared to about 24% of CEOs, sit on outside boards. We find robust evidence that CFO outside directorships are associated with fewer underinvestment problems, lower sensitivity between cash holdings and cash flows, and higher long‐term performance at their home firm, consistent with positive knowledge transfer by the CFO. On the other hand, we find little evidence of knowledge transfer for CEO outside board directorships, consistent with concerns that executives are too busy to hold outside directorships. Our findings support a need to recognize that outside directorships could provide benefits for some but not all executives. For CFOs, our findings support the argument that outside directorships provide CFOs an opportunity to network with and learn from other executives and directors, enabling these CFOs to improve practices in their home firm.