Information acquisition and voting with heterogeneous experts
研究社会规划者如何选择有偏见的专家来获取信息，并分析顺序与同时机制下多数规则对社会福利的影响，发现低信息成本时同时机制更优，超级多数规则可能优于简单多数。
Abstract A social planner selects heterogeneously biased experts to (either sequentially or simultaneously) acquire costly signals, and then agents vote between two alternatives. To maximize social welfare, the social planner adopts an alternating mechanism —choosing extremely biased experts whose preferences oppose the pivotal voter's current preference—in the optimal sequential mechanism, whereas she chooses mildly biased experts in the optimal simultaneous mechanism. Despite the flexibility of a sequential mechanism, the optimal simultaneous mechanism can achieve strictly higher social welfare when information cost is low. Supermajority rules can dominate simple majority rule in terms of both information acquisition and social welfare.