Utilitarian Aggregation with Heterogeneous Beliefs
针对异质性信念下标准帕累托条件与分离加总不相容的问题，提出信念稳健帕累托条件，限制一致同意于社会认为合理的信念，从而在Anscombe-Aumann和Savage框架下实现信念与偏好的分离加总。
The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Anscombe-Aumann and the Savage framework, that the belief-proof Pareto condition is equivalent to separate aggregation of individual beliefs and tastes.