Securing Property Rights
研究了排污者损害多个所有者时，产权规则、责任规则与规制在效率上的比较，验证了卡拉布雷西-梅拉梅德猜想，并利用美国《清洁水法》前后水质数据验证了模型预测。
A central challenge in securing property rights is the subversion of justice. We present a model of a polluter whose discharges harm multiple owners, and we compare property rules, liability rules, and regulation on efficiency grounds. We provide conditions under which property rules are preferred to liability rules, thus verifying the Calabresi-Melamed conjecture. Regulation that enforces partial abatement may be preferred to either of the extreme rules. An empirical analysis of water quality in the United States before and after the Clean Water Act shows that the effects of regulation are consistent with several predictions of the model.