The sandwich game: Founder-CEOs and forecasting as impression management
研究创始人CEO与非创始人CEO在向现有投资者报告收入预测时，是否使用不同偏差程度的正面预测作为印象管理策略，发现创始人CEO更少提供正面偏差的预测。
Drawing on impression management and social exchange theory, we examine the use of positively biased forecasts by (non-)founder-CEOs as an impression management tactic vis-à-vis their existing investors. Contrary to their non-founder counterparts, founder-CEOs identify more with the venture they founded and, therefore, experience greater instrumental and affective concerns about the long-term relationship with their investors. Consequently, we hypothesize that founder-CEOs will strategically provide less positively biased forecasts to their investors than non-founder-CEOs. Using two independent samples with revenue forecasts reported to different venture capital investors and a causal chain scenario study consisting of two experiments, we find consistent support for our hypothesis. Overall, this study provides new insights into the use of forecasts as a post-investment impression management tactic by distinct types of CEOs in entrepreneurial ventures.