Screening soft information: evidence from loan officers
利用中国数据评估信贷员如何筛选未编码的软信息，发现信贷员存在风险规避、能力异质性和过度自信，但仍比忽略软信息的基准模型更有价值。
Abstract I evaluate how loan officers screen uncodified, soft information using data from China. After documenting substantial differences in loan decisions and outcomes across loan officers, I develop and estimate a screening model incorporating screening ability and beliefs regarding ability. Estimates imply that the typical loan officer is risk‐averse, has heterogeneous screening ability, and behaves overconfidently—behaving as if he or she observes more from soft information than what the data would indicate. However, I still find that loan officers offer value over benchmarks that ignore soft information. Counterfactuals on compensation, loan assignment, and training further explore the limits of screening.