Coordinating Public Good Provision by Mediated Communication
研究两个代理人如何在两个领域分配固定预算以提供公共品，发现直接沟通无效，而中介过滤信息可改善协调，对设计人道主义援助的信息管理系统有启示。
We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget between public goods in two areas. The agents may be biased to one area, which is their private information. Without communication, the funds are allocated inefficiently, resulting in gaps and duplication in public good provision. Direct communication between the agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure even when the potential biases are negligible. Coordination can be improved by a mediator who filters the information communicated by the agents. Our results can throw light on how to improve coordination of humanitarian aid by an appropriately designed information management system.