Good Deeds Done in Silence: Stakeholder Management and Quiet Giving by Chinese Firms
研究中国上市公司为何对慈善捐赠保持沉默，发现当企业亏待员工或投资者时，更可能低调捐赠以避免利益相关者反弹，而长期导向因素会减弱这一关系。
We propose a new mechanism explaining why companies may remain silent about their positive corporate behaviors, such as socially responsible activities. We examine such strategic silence in the context of corporate philanthropy. Building on and extending the literature on legitimacy and stakeholder management, we argue that when a firm mistreats primary stakeholders, it is more likely to keep quiet about its philanthropic acts to avoid backlash from stakeholders. We also propose that long-term orientation among stakeholders mitigates the positive relationship between mistreating primary stakeholders and quiet giving, which allows stakeholders to appreciate the long-term value of corporate philanthropy. Data from listed Chinese firms show that firms are more likely to give quietly when they underpay their employees and/or investors. Moreover, research and development expenditures and institutional shareholding, as indicators of stakeholder long-term orientation, attenuate this relationship.