The Importance of Oversight and Agency Capacity in Enhancing Performance in Public Service Delivery
研究美国州级机构在社会保障残疾项目中的绩效数据，发现机构自身能力和监督机构能力共同影响机构对绩效不佳的响应和改善，且监督能力的效果依赖于高机构能力。
Abstract Government agencies often encounter problems in service delivery when implementing public programs. This undermines effectiveness and raise questions about accountability. A central component of responsiveness and performance management is that agencies correct course when problems are identified. However, public agencies have an uneven record in responding to problems. In this article, we investigate whether, and to what extent, capacity both within the agency and within institutions performing oversight improves agency responsiveness to poor-performance indicators. Using panel data on eligibility determinations in the Social Security Disability program from US state agencies from 1991 to 2015 and fixed effects regression, we find that indicators of agency and oversight capacity moderate the relationship between poor performance and improvement. Our results suggest that investments in building capacity not only within agencies, but also within elected institutions, are important for successful policy implementation. However, we find evidence that while agency capacity alone can improve responsiveness to poor performance, the effect of oversight capacity on improving performance requires high agency capacity.