Managerial discretion and shareholder capital at risk
研究管理层投资决策如何使股东资本面临风险，以及股东在保留自由裁量权但降低激励强度与直接施加项目约束之间的选择，发现资本暴露程度是偏向约束的关键因素。
Abstract Managerial investment decisions put shareholder capital at risk. Shareholders respond either (i) by preserving the manager's discretion to choose among projects but decreasing the power of his (her) incentives, thereby decreasing the manager's gains from choosing risky projects, or (ii) by imposing a constraint on the type of project that the manager can undertake. We show that capital exposure—the extent to which managerial decisions put shareholder capital at risk—plays a central role in favoring the imposition of a constraint over the granting of discretion. We extend our analysis to consider other determinants of the choice between discretion and constraint.