Water Quality Trading in the Presence of Conservation Subsidies
研究了水质交易与保护补贴政策的相互作用，发现补贴项目中的农户会因比较优势进入交易市场，加剧逆向选择，实际减排效果取决于能否激励新增保护面积而不引发植被转耕地。
Most studies of water quality trading analyze its cost-effectiveness in isolation from existing policies like conservation subsidy programs that pay farmers to use conservation practices. We investigate the interaction between trading and conservation subsidy programs using an integrated assessment model that combines farmer behavioral responses with a biophysical water quality model. Current subsidy program enrollees with comparative advantage in nitrogen abatement will sort into the trading program, worsening adverse selection. Actual increases in abatement from trading depend on incentivizing additional conservation practice acreage without inducing the conversion of vegetative cover to cropland. <i></i>