Should a Poverty-Averse Donor Always Reward Better Governance? A Paradox of Aid Allocation
研究了一个厌恶贫困的捐赠者在分配援助时，若对贫困的厌恶足够强，改善治理的国家反而会得到更少援助，但穷人境况仍会改善。
Abstract This article revisits the inter-country aid allocation by a donor who must distribute a given aid amount and is sensitive to needs and governance considerations. Against conventional wisdom, if the donor has strong enough aversion to poverty, the share of a country whose governance has improved is reduced. Yet, the poor will still be better off. These results continue to hold when aid effectiveness depends on intrinsic governance and the volume of aid received, and when a more general dynamic specification is considered. Finally, using our approach, the allocation rules in international organisations appear as clearly privileging governance over needs.