Delayed informed trades and opinion divergence: Evidence from earnings releases
研究了盈余公告前后延迟知情交易的发生，发现延迟知情交易越多，公告后投资者意见分歧越大，且信息复杂性、股票非流动性和机构竞争会促使投资者延迟交易。
Abstract This study begins to verify whether delayed informed trades occur surrounding an earnings release. Next, we discover that post‐event investor opinions tend to diverge when more informed trades are delayed after the earnings release. As additional empirical evidence indicates, investors are likely compelled to postpone their informed trades due to information complexity, stock illiquidity, and institutional competition. Finally, such a documented association between delayed informed trades and opinion divergence remains robust to the placebo test, endogeneity problem, and large‐cap sample bias.