Executive pensions and the pay–performance relation—Evidence from changes to pension legislation in the UK
利用英国养老金免税额度改革的自然实验，研究发现该改革导致高管养老金被无风险现金支付替代，显著削弱了薪酬与公司绩效之间的关联。
Abstract This article evaluates the role of executive pensions in the relationship between executive compensation and corporate performance. As a natural experiment, we exploit a major change to the tax-free allowances governing executive pensions. This reform affected the cost of pensions for firms whose executives had accumulated pension benefits in excess of the prescribed limit. We find a strong reaction to the reform. After 6 April 2006, many executives saw their defined benefit pension schemes replaced with risk-free cash payments. This imposition of an exogenous constraint on the contracting over CEO pay significantly decreased the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.