Chief Executive Officer Regulatory Focus and Competitive Action Frequency
研究了CEO的促进型或预防型监管焦点如何影响企业竞争行动频率，并发现CEO与高管团队在职能背景和任期上的差异会调节这一关系。
Using regulatory focus, the Chief Executive Officer-Top Management Team (CEO-TMT) interface, and upper echelons theories, the present study casts additional light on the competitive action frequency of firms, as determined by their chief executive officers (CEOs) regulatory focus under the contingent effect of the CEO–TMT dissimilarity of informational demographics. Applying regulatory focus and upper echelons theories, this study first hypothesizes how CEO regulatory focus influences competitive action frequency. Next, leveraging CEO–TMT interface research, this study suggests moderating effects on the part of CEO–TMT dissimilarity, across functional background and tenure, and on the relationship between CEO regulatory focus and competitive action frequency. Drawing on a sample of 218 firms from India for a 5-year period (2010–2015), we find that a CEO promotion focus enhances a firm’s competitive action frequency and that a prevention focus diminishes the same. Furthermore, dissimilarities in terms of both CEO–TMT functional background orientation and tenure in the organization moderate this relationship. This study concludes with a discussion of the article’s theoretical and practical implications.