Earning investor trust: The role of past earnings management
研究发现，企业过去避免盈余管理能增强投资者对未来盈余意外的反应，尤其在投资者信任受损的行业，表明投资者将管理层抵制误报诱惑视为可信度的试金石。
Abstract Does earnings management, even though legal, hinder investor trust in reported earnings? Or do investors regard earnings management as a way for firms to convey private information, or simply as a neutral feature of financial reporting? We find that past abstinence from earnings management increases investor responses to future earnings surprises. Importantly, this effect occurs in industries where investor trust has recently been violated, and where managers would in the past have had incentives and opportunities to misrepresent earnings. Overall, investors seem to interpret the extent to which management resists temptations for misreporting as a “litmus test” of trustworthiness.