Spoilt and Lazy: The Impact of State Support on Bank Behavior in the International Loan Market
分析了获得高支持评级的银行在银团贷款市场中的行为，发现它们低估风险、贷款利差更低，且贷款组合缺乏专业化，更随市场趋势变化。
We analyze the syndicated loan market activity of banks with high support ratings. We find evidence that they underprice risk. Controlling for other characteristics, loans arranged by supported banks have, on average, lower spreads. In addition, these banks retain loans that are, on average, priced below market. At the same time, we do not find evidence suggesting that supported banks play any special role through strategic loan participation. Compared with other banks, their loan portfolios are less specialized, are more closely aligned with prevailing market trends, and exhibit lower persistence in their sectoral allocations.