Policy Persistence and Drift in Organizations
研究了允许成员自由进出的组织（如城市和工会）中政策的演化，发现政策变化会吸引新成员并驱离不满者，导致政策向短视稳定点收敛，且成员越有耐心收敛越慢。
This paper models the evolution of organizations that allow free entry and exit of members, such as cities and trade unions. In each period, current members choose a policy for the organization. Policy changes attract newcomers and drive away dissatisfied members, altering the set of future policymakers. The resulting feedback effects take the organization down a “slippery slope” that converges to a myopically stable policy, even if the agents are forward‐looking, but convergence becomes slower the more patient they are. The model yields a tractable characterization of the steady state and the transition dynamics. The analysis is also extended to situations in which the organization can exclude members, such as enfranchisement and immigration.